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Abstract
THE REPRODUCTIVE BODY:
EXPLORING REPRODUCTION BEYOND GENDER
by
Ilyssa A. Silfen
Advisor: Professor Matthew Brim
Most of us have been taught over the course of our lives that biological sex, gender, and
reproduction are inescapably linked and, over time, this has created the illusion that these are all
naturally connected. However, these “natural” connections have been formed over time after
generations of repetition. While it may seem impossible to separate biological sex, gender, and
reproduction from one another, it is important to deconstruct this falsely organic system from
both a gender and human rights perspective.
This thesis seeks to explore the complex relationship between society’s reproductive
mandate and the reality of the various processes of reproduction in relationship with gender.
While society, on paper, simply demands that everyone reproduce, the truth is that society only
wants a certain subset of people to do so—those who are heterosexual, cisgender, and behave in
conventionally gendered ways. This thesis further examines the gender and biological
essentialism inherent in society’s reproductive mandate and explores this mandate in relationship
with trans* reproduction, noting that there are certain standards to which trans* individuals are
held in order for their gender to be deemed authentic that cis* individuals are not.
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Introduction
Most of us have been taught over the course of our lives that biological sex, gender, and
the various processes of reproduction are inexorably linked, soldered together in a seemingly
organic manner, creating the illusion that all of these things are somehow naturally connected.
We have been taught that biological male equals masculine, biological female equals feminine,
that masculine men desire feminine women and vice versa, and that any alternatives to these
combinations either do not exist or are somehow sinful and wrong. This is connected to the
belief that only men father children and only women give birth to them. It may seem impossible
to extricate biological sex, gender, and reproduction from one another, especially considering our
socialization to believe that these connections are unutterably true, but it is very important to
deconstruct this falsely organic system and prove that these seemingly “natural” connections are
not very natural at all. In a society where it is possible to change one’s legally recognized gender
and to physically transition from one body to another—from male to female (M to F) and from
female to male (F to M)—it is also entirely possible for a man to carry a pregnancy to term and
give birth, and for a woman to father children.
Pregnancy as a process—and reproduction as a whole—reveals the politics behind the
way in which we choose to engage the relationships between biology (i.e. the body) and gender,
specifically the ways in which we identify and classify physical characteristics in relation to our
exposure to heteronormative social and cultural belief systems. The processes of reproduction
are strictly gendered, and as a result, these processes are treated as evidence of gender both in
terms of physicality and ability. Arguments abound concerning the issue of men giving birth and
women fathering children, with many believing that if you choose to transition gender and
nevertheless use the reproductive organs with which you were born (and therefore the organs
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with which you are supposed to no longer identify) in order to produce children, you are not
actually the gender with which you identify. In other words, if you are transitioning from male
to female for example, it is believed that you are not really a man if you choose to use your
uterus to give birth to children, because the uterus has been characterized as a female organ. In
that vein, the various reproductive processes, as well as the figure of the child, act as both
signifier and condition of legitimacy, as well as a privilege of that legitimacy. In other words,
the reproduction of children is believed to only be possible if you are a “real” (cisgender) man or
woman, and the production of said children is a privilege of being proven to be a “real”
(cisgender) man or woman. The reproduction of children, as well as the ability to produce
children, is considered significant proof of gender authenticity, whereas trans*1 individuals who
produce children are considered as not truly being their identified status as a man or a woman
since they are using their biological reproductive organs (e.g. the organs with which they are
assumed to not identify in terms of their gender identity) in order to produce children.
Furthermore, the inability to reproduce as one’s self-identified gender is also used as a signifier
of gender inauthenticity (e.g. if you are born biologically male but identify as female, the fact
that you cannot gestate and give birth to a child will count as evidence against your female
identity). Unlike cisgender individuals, for whom fertility—and the use of it—is proof of their
gender authenticity, for trans* individuals, the only proof of their gender authenticity is total
sterility. It is in this way that one’s gender authenticity is inherently predicated on one’s
reproductive capabilities (and vice versa).
The physicality of gender is in direct relationship with its social nature, where our
physical body has to align “properly” with our gender identity in order for us to be perceived by
1

The asterisk after the word “trans” is in place to include all non-cisgender gender identities and
will be used throughout this paper.
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society as authentic. A critique exists in both the cisgender and LGBTQ communities that once
you begin to identify as the gender opposite from the one you were assigned at birth (to borrow
the terminology of the gender binary), you lose the privilege of reproducing children in the way
that the gender of your birth would allow you to. This is particularly indicative of how biology
and its relationship with gender dictates what we perceive as normal when it comes to pregnancy
and reproduction; it also brings up the question of whether or not it is logical to place a gender
on certain biological processes (such as reproduction) or on certain organs (the testes, the
ovaries, the vagina, the penis, etc.). In a society where we can legally change our sex, where we
can transition from one body to another, thereby making it possible for men to give birth and for
women to father children, is it feasible to continue to denote motherhood as belonging to women
and fatherhood as belonging to men? My conclusion is that it is not, and as a result, I believe
that we must take the gender out of reproduction altogether and focus on the functionality of our
reproductive organs rather on their significance in our gendered identities, and we must
acknowledge that people of many genders (not just male and female) exist, and that many of
these people will choose to reproduce. In other words, rather than focusing on reproductive
organs and processes as sites of gendered meaning (e.g. ovaries and pregnancy = woman, testes
and ejaculation = man), we could instead focus solely on their reproductive capacity. If we
chose to ungender reproduction, it is entirely probable that we would begin to discuss pregnancy
as a pathway to fatherhood as well as motherhood—ejaculation as a pathway to motherhood as
well as fatherhood. Not only would the ungendering of reproduction create processes of
reproduction without gender, but it could also possibly end the reproduction of gender.
One of the ways that we could go about producing this change would be to expand our
understanding of gender and its relationship to reproduction in terms of both
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physicality/capability and their social construction, separating gender from body parts and
acknowledging that neither biology nor gender are as strict as we would like to believe. In
talking about the physicality of gender, I am specifically talking about the biological
characteristics and physical cues that we use in order to determine one’s sex (e.g. secondary sex
characteristics), such as developed breasts, the presence or absence of body and/or facial hair,
and/or the presence or absence of curves. These physical cues are used as evidence of one’s
biological sex, which in turn causes many people to assume one’s gender. Each reproductive
process (pregnancy and insemination) has a specific gender and biological sex attached to it due
to repeated assertions about who does what in reproduction. In the example of Thomas Beatie,
his pregnant body caused quite a stir in the general public and caused us to take a second look at
what gender and biological sex have to do with pregnancy, as well as reproduction as a whole.
While identifying as a man, and after having a double mastectomy and hormone treatments so
that his physical body would match his gender identity, he used his biologically female
reproductive organs in order to produce children. His pregnancy, after it became public
knowledge, quickly garnered mass publicity, much of it fierce condemnation. The majority of
this rejection had to do with our collective inability to recognize and accept a pregnant male
body. Our culture dictates that pregnancy is specifically a female process (read: belonging to cis
women), so when we came face-to-face with a pregnant man, it forced us to ask ourselves, is
pregnancy (and the pregnant body) truly inherently female? In that same vein, is insemination
(and the associated body) truly inherently male? What do our conceptions of gender and
biological sex in relation to reproduction say about our conceptions of gender and biological sex
overall? That we feel the need to ask these questions, and the answers that are often provided,
proves that society is confused about its own reproductive mandate. This mandate is inherently
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flawed, and a tension exists between the basic demand that the reproductive mandate makes of
society’s members (“Everyone must reproduce”) and what the mandate is actually requiring.
The reproductive mandate is clearly geared toward a specific subset of society, which is
heterosexual couples consisting of one cisgender, conventionally masculine man and one
cisgender, conventionally feminine woman. Any reproductive act that occurs outside of that
subset is considered abnormal and suspect despite the fact that, on paper, all society’s
reproductive mandate demands is that people reproduce—there is no actual specification
concerning who must do the reproducing. The result of the continuous repetition of this specific
type of reproduction being touted as the norm is confusion concerning to whom reproduction
belongs, who has (and should have) the privilege of reproducing, and the gendered implications
of certain reproductive capabilities and processes.

Gender and Biological Essentialism in Reproduction
Gender essentialism is inherent in our perceptions of reproduction, so much so that even
our gametes are assigned gendered behaviors. There are two types of gametes – ovum, which
are characterized as female, and sperm, which are characterized as male. We often forget that,
despite their characterization as female and male, respectively, ovum and sperm have the same
basic function—providing the genetic material necessary to produce a baby. In her article "The
Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical MaleFemale Roles,” Emily Martin asks us to examine the ways in which the egg and the sperm are
characterized, stating:
Take the egg and the sperm. It is remarkable how "femininely" the egg behaves
and how "masculinely" the sperm. The egg is seen as large and passive. It does
not move or journey, but passively "is transported," "is swept," or even "drifts"
along the fallopian tube. In utter contrast, sperm are small, "streamlined," and
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invariably active. They "deliver" their genes to the egg, "activate the
developmental program of the egg," and have a "velocity" that is often remarked
upon. Their tails are "strong" and efficiently powered. Together with the forces
of ejaculation, they can "propel the semen into the deepest recesses of the
vagina." For this they need "energy," "fuel," so that with a "whiplashlike
motion and strong lurches" they can "burrow through the egg coat" and
"penetrate" it (489).
The eggs and sperm, despite having absolutely no consciousness, and therefore no conscious
motivation concerning their respective roles in reproduction, are given stereotypically feminine
and masculine characteristics, with the feminine characteristics of passivity (and therefore the
eggs) being portrayed as negative and the masculine characteristics of aggressiveness (and
therefore the sperm) being portrayed as positive. Martin goes on to note that "[i]n the case of
women, the monthly cycle is described as being designed to produce eggs and prepare a suitable
place for them to be fertilized and grown, all to the end of making babies.... By extolling the
female cycle as a productive enterprise, menstruation must necessarily be viewed as a failure”
(486). This construction of menstruation as a failure rather than a natural biological process that
has nothing to do with failure or success is indicative of the extent of the social construction of
motherhood as a necessity for all women, and characterizes women’s monthly menstruation as a
sign/reminder that they have failed in the ultimate womanly endeavor. It is quite interesting to
note that this is not coming from a purely sociological/cultural standpoint, but rather from a
scientific/biological standpoint with sociological/cultural undertones attached to it. The
characterization of menstruation as a failure of the woman to produce a child perpetuates the idea
that women's biological capacity to reproduce should automatically translate into a
compulsory/required act. Adrienne Rich makes the observation that
None of the “experts’” advice has been either particularly scientific or womenoriented; it has reflected male needs, male fantasies about women, and male
interest in controlling women—particularly in the realms of sexuality and
motherhood…(230).
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Here, Rich examines the institution of motherhood, and the way that it is medicalized and
(re)defined by men, as another means of women’s oppression. It is surely no coincidence or
mistake that motherhood has become compulsory and that motherhood and womanhood are so
intricately linked. Femininity is linked so intrinsically with the institution of motherhood due to
the perceived inherent characteristics of nurturing instinct, emotional availability, and passivity,
all of which are believed to make one a good mother, as well as a good woman.
When looking at gender, specifically at masculinity and femininity and what each means
to us, we often look to the abstract concepts of behavioral patterns. In our society, aggression
and competitiveness are considered to be masculine while passivity and nurturing are considered
to be feminine. However, much of our understanding of gender also comes from the physicality
of it—there are certain bodily characteristics that we read as either masculine or feminine. For
example, most people would associate a more muscular body with masculinity, as opposed to a
softer body, which would be associated with femininity. When the conceptualization of
pregnancy enters the picture, this concept of the physicality of gender is particularly important to
note, especially concerning how it relates to our notions of gender (specifically femininity). In
her study “The Gender of Pregnancy: Masculine Lesbians Talk about Reproduction,” Maura
Ryan notes that “[h]eterosexism and patriarchy collude to create an expectation of pregnancy for
all women. In addition, the bodily production of pregnancy has been socially gendered as
feminine because of its association with female-bodied people” (119). In other words, the
repetitive nature of female-bodied persons going through the biological process of pregnancy and
childbirth has created the assumption that pregnancy belongs only to female-bodied persons
(read: cisgender women). Ryan decided to interview only childfree lesbians for this study
because of her observation that the “two ideological codes—that all women should become
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mothers through pregnancy and that pregnancy is a femininely gendered endeavor—suggest a
conundrum for masculine lesbians” (119). When she conducted these interviews, she found that
“all participants agreed that feminine pregnancy is a cultural construction. Still [in the context of
why they chose to avoid pregnancy], they talked about [the theoretical condition of] being
pregnant as becoming, feeling, and being perceived as more feminine than one might have been
before pregnancy” (Ryan 125). While pregnancy is perceived as a cultural construction, there is
still an association with typical femininity and with being perceived as feminine, even though
pregnancy as a biological process is neither masculine nor feminine. In fact, “many of [the
participants’] comments illustrated a distinctly essentialist understanding of pregnancy
necessitating femininity. For instance, all participants noted that pregnancy introduces bodily
changes that highlight biological femaleness, which is conflated with femininity” (Ryan 125).
The curvy, non-pregnant body in and of itself is perceived as feminine, whether that body is
perceived as male or female; however, pregnancy brings on bodily changes like enlarged
breasts, wider hips, and a protruding stomach, which are believed to amplify one’s femininity
and make it even more obvious. Pregnancy, and the physical changes that come with it,
amplifies the attributes that we read as feminine and makes more obvious what specific bodily
characteristics we look for in order to read someone as female. Ryan noted that for those
participants whose masculinity is contingent on their bodily appearance, even though they
already “currently have female bodies they expressed concern that they could have more of a
female body than they do now” (125). This brings to mind an interesting concept of the
physical, gendered body as existing on a continuum or spectrum. If it is true that one’s physical
portrayal of gender (in other words, the gender they choose to present with their bodies) is
contingent on physical characteristics such as body and/or facial hair, the possession of a
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muscular or curvy body, and wearing one’s hair short or long, then it makes sense that the
reproductive process of pregnancy—and the changes that they would experience—would have
high stakes for someone who identifies as masculine and/or male. In that vein, it is easy to
understand how and why pregnancy is treated as proof of cis women’s femininity and
femaleness. When a woman becomes pregnant, not only is her abstract femininity confirmed,
but her physical “femaleness” is confirmed as well. In another study titled “Reproductive Wish
in Transsexual Men,” eleven out of the fifty trans* men who participated in the study had
children, and “three of the participants gave birth themselves before hormonal therapy and SRS.
Two of those three participants who gave birth themselves experienced this as (very)
problematic, while one participant found this experience very pleasant” (Wierckx et al. 485). It
is not indicated why the two participants found the childbirth experience problematic, but based
upon my other research, it is reasonable to assume that they felt their gender identity clashed
with the biological process of pregnancy and childbirth, which has been categorized as
essentially female and involves “female” body parts in order to complete. In order to eliminate
the concept of pregnancy as being a specifically feminine and/or female process, we would need
to go even deeper and eliminate the concept of gendered bodily characteristics, which is no easy
task!
In our society, we define bodies as male and female. If we were to ask ourselves as a
society exactly how we would go about defining these bodies, we would likely argue that we do
so by looking at reproductive organs and secondary sexual characteristics. Going beyond that,
we might even argue that chromosomes are the deciding factor in determining gender. For
example, if somebody has two X chromosomes, they “must” be female, no matter what their
external appearance and no matter what surgeries they may have had. However, in all of these
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delineations of male and female, we forget the role of culture in constituting male and female as
categories that supposedly have unambiguous biological referents. Biology itself certainly did
not decide that two X chromosomes denote a female and that one X and one Y chromosome
denote a male. Is there something inherent in the X chromosome that makes it female and in the
Y chromosome that makes it male? Judith Butler argues in her book Undoing Gender that, in
our society, how “the genetic presence of the ‘Y’ works in tacit ways to structure feeling and
self-understanding as a sexed person is the basis [for evidence of one’s male gender]” (64).
Even though the Y chromosome in and of itself is not necessarily inherently male, we have been
socialized to believe that its very presence in a person’s body indicates that the person is male.
In that same vein, is there something inherent in the uterus/ovaries/vagina that makes them
female and in the testicles/penis that make them male? There is absolutely no actual biological
evidence that there is a specific gender tied to any of these chromosomes and organs, except for
the evidence that people decided exists. There is no reason that we cannot expand our
conceptions of pregnancy to include men and insemination to include women, nor is there any
reason why we cannot talk about the male uterus, male ovaries, or a male vagina, as well as
female testes and a female penis. There is nothing about any of these things that we can pinpoint
as being specifically masculine or feminine, and therefore as belonging to only men or women.
After all, biology is not nearly as strict as many people would like to think it is. For example,
most of us learned in school that the male of the seahorse species carries and gives birth to their
young. Even human biology is pretty lax—biology produces human beings that reside outside
the boundaries of the gender binary all the time. I cite the example of gynecomastia, which is
defined as “swelling of the breast tissue in boys or men, caused by an imbalance of the hormones
estrogen and testosterone” (Mayo Clinic). The definition itself reveals a gender binary bias, in
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that the swelling of the breast tissue is defined as a medical problem and as being the result of a
hormonal imbalance. The only reason it is being described as such is because our culture
dictates that men must have a certain level of hormones (more testosterone than estrogen) and a
certain type of body (muscular, angular)—therefore, it is no surprise in that context that a boy or
a man would be described as having “too much” estrogen and “too little” testosterone, resulting
in the development of breasts, which are a specifically “female” body part.
Biology also produces intersex individuals, whom Judith Butler defines as having
“sexually indeterminate or hermaphroditic anatomy” (4). In our society, we treat intersex
individuals as abnormalities who require surgery in order to fix them when, in reality, there is
nothing wrong with intersex individuals at all. As Butler notes, we need to come to “an
understanding that [people] with intersexed conditions are part of the continuum of human
morphology” (4). In other words, rather than viewing intersex individuals as being abnormal, we
need to expand our collective vision of gender and make it more comprehensive; we do not exist
in a binary, but a spectrum, and intersex individuals are simply another part of that spectrum.
There are also chromosomal variations such as Triple X Syndrome, where a female-bodied
person carries an extra X-chromosome (Mayo Clinic), Klinefelter syndrome, where a malebodied person carries an extra X-chromosome (Mayo Clinic), XYY syndrome, where a malebodied person carries an extra Y-chromosome (Holland), and Turner Syndrome, where a femalebodied person is missing an X chromosome or carries one that is incomplete (The University of
Utah). We characterize these biological characteristics as “abnormal” as a direct result of our
socialization into the sex and gender binaries, not because there is anything actually biologically
wrong, per se (there are cases where these chromosomal conditions can result in moderate to
severe negative health effects, but most people live very ordinary and healthy lives), but because
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we fail to conceptualize the possibility that they are simply natural variations of sex and gender.
Just because someone has a chromosomal makeup that is not XX or XY does not mean that they
are inherently abnormal or flawed, and it is crucial for us to begin to conceptualize a gender
spectrum, rather than a binary, in order to be more inclusive of those whose bodies and genders
do not necessarily fit into the artificial gender binary. As Butler argues, we need to “question
why society maintains the ideal of gender dimorphism when a significant percentage of [people]
are chromosomally various” (65) and recognize that “a continuum exists between male and
female that suggests the arbitrariness and falsity of the gender dimorphism as a prerequisite of
human development” (65). This is particularly important for trans* men with working “female”
reproductive systems and trans* women with working “male” reproductive systems—especially
those who have chosen to use them to produce biological children—in that it is more inclusive
and acknowledges that some men will, in fact, give birth, and some women will father children.
Physicality is not the only factor in how we interpret gender identities and integrate them
into our understanding of the world. There are social factors as well, such as family ties, which
allow the general population to translate gender difference into something that they can
understand more clearly. Both the physicality and the social aspect of gender are represented a
great deal in Landau’s article “Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity.” The article is a
write-up of a study that Landau did in which she showed two digital photographs of a heavily
pregnant Thomas Beatie (a transgender man who kept his biologically female reproductive
organs in order to be able to bear children, choosing to do so because his then-wife was infertile)
to a group of American women of childbearing age and recorded their ideological, emotional,
and physical interactions with the photographs (178). The first picture portrayed Beatie by
himself, one hand behind his head and the other holding his pregnant belly. Landau notes that
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the women “more often than not…focused on specific visual codes that they interpreted as
‘masculine’ or ‘manly,’ such as facial and armpit hair and ‘no breasts.’ Then they focused on
how the ‘stomach’ or ‘belly’ stuck out because it was a ‘beer belly’ or a disease of some sort”
(186). The women in this study react to this image in a very interesting way—the visual of
Beatie’s pregnant belly, something that has been traditionally characterized as female,
emphasizes his masculine traits all the more. Rather than focusing on his pregnant belly, most of
the participants noted his masculine/“manly” traits and then tried to explain his pregnant belly
after the fact. In the second picture, Beatie is portrayed with his wife Nancy, who has her head
on his chest and is cradling his pregnant belly. Landau notes that “the majority of the women
interacted with Figure 2 in some ways that were similar to their interaction with Figure 1, such as
how they ideologically decoded traditional visual symbols of facial hair as meaning a ‘man.’
Overall, the women ‘made sense’ of a ‘pregnant (transgender) man’ and a ‘happy family’
instead” (190). In their reactions and interactions with the second photograph, rather than
reproducing the figure of a pregnant man, they specifically reproduced the figure of a pregnant
transgender man, asking questions about the symbolism of transgender and commenting and
questioning the scientific and medical possibilities therein (Landau 191). In other words, in
order to understand Beatie’s pregnancy, rather than reading Beatie as a man, the women had to
specifically read Beatie as a trans* man—they had to read him as someone who had previously
been female-bodied at some point in his life. This in and of itself is progress, according to
Landau, who argues that
for the most part [today’s women of child-bearing age] no longer make meaning
of pregnancy as traditionally female or feminine and disassociated from
masculine men, since “a pregnant (transgender) man” was reproduced. I suggest
that this is hopeful for challenging gender and biological essentialisms related to
human reproduction because it is an alternative to the norm…Even more
progressive is the fairly positive feelings and ideological interpretation of the
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visual symbol of a pregnant man who was “transgender,” since just the use of that
terminology promotes nonbinary gender and sexuality. (Landau 192-3)
Despite reading Beatie as male, not only were the women in the study able to conceptualize the
idea of a pregnant transgender man, they were also able to react to it positively. Beatie’s
existence as a pregnant transgender man in and of itself indicates that the reproduced
sociological norms relating to the relationship between biological reproductive capacity, gender
identity, and sexuality can be (and are being) transgressed. Landau states that “[i]t is plausible
that the protruding (pregnant) belly comically revealed, at least to some of the women of childbearing age, the distinction between the anatomy of men and the performance of gender, a
contingent relation that is all too often and erroneously assumed to be natural” (188). For the
women participating in the study, Beatie’s pregnant belly does not only emphasize his masculine
traits, but it also reveals the performativity of gender vs. the socio-cultural dictates of biology.
Gender essentialism has played a large role in the general public’s reaction to Thomas
Beatie’s pregnancy, including his pregnant body and how that body was interpreted within the
context of our society’s conceptions of biological sex and the related reproductive processes and
capacities. As a society, we expect certain bodies of certain biological make-up and gender
representation to reproduce in specific biological and gendered ways. Beatie pushes against the
norms of heteronormative cisgender reproduction in that he uses a visually male body in a
conventionally “female” manner for the purposes of reproduction and refuses to see himself as
any less of a man because of it. I return to Jamie Landau’s study in the next chapter to explore
the societal and cultural implications of the gender essentialism inherent in our reactions to
reproductive bodies that exist outside the socially accepted sex/gender/reproductive intersection.

15

Connecting Biology, Normative Gender Roles, and Reproduction
In order to analyze the role of normative gender roles in reproduction (and vice versa),
we must look at Darwin’s work. In her book Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and
Sexuality in Nature and People, in a chapter titled “The Theory of Evolution,” Joan
Roughgarden discusses Darwin’s theory of evolution and sexual selection and how he applied a
deeply sexist and heteronormative social hierarchy and structure to the biological processes of
the natural world. She notes that
Darwin pejoratively viewed diversity within a species as a hierarchy beginning
with superior individuals and winding down do the “retarded,” a view that is
diversity-repressing and elitist, stressing a weeding out of the weak and sickly and
naturalizing male domination of females....The contradiction evident in Darwin’s
attitude to diversity within species…plagues our society today, from biology and
medicine to politics and law. (Roughgarden 165)
In other words, even though Darwin published his theory long ago, the contents of his theory
have had far-reaching implications in practically all aspects of our society. We continue to
believe that men are hard-wired to be sexually aggressive and that women are hard-wired to
accept it. In relation to this, Roughgarden discusses a then-recent publication of a theory of the
naturalness of rape, where the argument is made that “men unable to find mates in the ‘usual
way’ can reproduce through rape. Genes for rape then increase, leading to the brain’s acquisition
of a ‘rape chip.’ All men are therefore potential rapists, although they do not necessarily act on
this potential, depending on external circumstances” (173). Another example of the defense of
male sexual aggressiveness as “natural” can be found in the article “Why Do Men Rape? An
Evolutionary Psychology Perspective” by William F. McKibbin, Todd K. Shackelford, Aaron T.
Goetz, and Valerie G. Starratt, which argues
For rape to be produced by evolved psychological mechanisms, it must have
recurrently generated reproductive benefits for ancestral rapists. These benefits
must have outweighed the costs that men may incur if they attempt or
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successfully complete a rape. Despite the costs, there is evidence that rape may
have increased the number of women with whom ancestral men copulated and,
therefore, the reproductive success of rapist males. (McKibbin et al. 88)
In this argument, the authors state that rape is an evolved behavior, i.e., an improved behavior
from our ancestors. Not only are the authors arguing that rape is an evolved behavior, they are
also arguing that there are reproductive benefits to rape, and therefore making the argument that
rape is evolutionarily beneficial. These are just a few examples of the many societal
repercussions of Darwin’s work that Roughgarden discusses in her chapter:
Today’s [sexual selection] theory makes matters worse by adding new mistakes,
morphing what Darwin actually wrote into a caricature of male hubris. According to
today’s version, males are supposed to be more promiscuous than females because sperm
are cheap, and hence males are continually roaming around looking for females to
fertilize. Conversely, females are supposed to be choosy because their eggs are
expensive, and hence they must guard their investment from being diluted with bad genes
from an inferior male. A male is naturally entitled to overpower a female’s reluctance
lest reproduction cease, extinguishing the species. (167-8)
Darwin’s theory of sexual selection is rooted in heterosexism and has resulted in what can only
be called a biological defense not only of a sex and gender binary, but also of male sexual
aggression and rape. As Roughgarden notes, “Sexual selection theory has long been used to
perpetuate ethically dubious gender stereotypes that demean women and anyone else who
doesn’t identify as a gender-normative heterosexual male” (172). Lesbians in particular, in a
society that is both deeply homophobic and sexist, face a unique sort of hostility; they face
derision not only because they are women who love women but also because, due to the fact that
they only love other women, men are removed from the equation entirely. They face a unique
spectrum of violence, ranging from minimization and being made invisible within society and
within their own families, to physical acts of violence such as murder and “corrective” rape. The
concept of corrective rape stems from the idea that women are only supposed to be sexually
attracted to men, the result of which is the belief that all lesbians need is a good man to remind
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them of their place. This physical act of extreme violence stems from the socially constructed
and unbending connection between biological sex and sexuality and extends into the connection
between gender and reproduction. While this connection is made out to be a natural, organic
connection, it is in reality a compulsory act, an act driven by social pressure and repetition,
creating the illusion that this connection is normal.
As Wittig argues in her critically important essay “One is Not Born a Woman,” women
are only women due to their social and political relationships with men—she states that “Once
the class ‘men’ disappears, ‘women’ as a class will disappear as well, for there are no slaves
without masters” (106). If women love women, they exclude men from their primary romantic,
emotional, and sexual lives, and they do not fulfill their socially constructed roles within
heterosexual relationships, heterosexual marriage, and reproduction, the latter of which is more
often than not a compulsory act. In that vein, Wittig acknowledges that women who control their
reproduction will also have to reject the label “woman,” stating that “gaining control of the
production of children will mean much more than the mere control of the material means of this
production: women will have to abstract themselves from the definition ‘woman’ which is
imposed upon them” (104). Our society conflates womanhood and motherhood to an excessive
degree, essentializing the biological capabilities of pregnancy and childbirth as well as the
supposedly natural and innate ability of childcare as the ultimate signifiers of woman-ness.
Therefore, it is not that far-fetched to argue that women who reject motherhood could also be
considered “not women” and that motherhood in and of itself is a socially constructed identity,
one that, to borrow and paraphrase Judith Butler’s argument concerning the performance of
gender, relies on repetition, performativity, and compulsion in order to be continually reproduced
as a natural given. Those of us who reject motherhood as an inevitability are often characterized
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as unnatural, further perpetuating the belief that womanmother is the natural cycle of things
and any other choice is, by definition, unnatural. In other words, to question motherhood is to
question womanhood, and by refusing to engage in the institution of motherhood, by refusing to
acknowledge motherhood as an unavoidable life course, we remove ourselves from a system that
defines us by our biologically determined reproductive and sociologically constructed nurturing
capabilities.
As Wittig states, “instead of seeing giving birth as a forced production, we see it as a
‘natural,’ ‘biological’ process, forgetting that in our societies births are planned (demography),
forgetting that we ourselves are programmed to produce children, while this is the only social
activity ‘short of war’ that presents such a danger of death” (104). When we provide young girls
with dolls, meant to prepare them for inevitable motherhood, we are preparing them through play
for a role that is supposedly naturally innate and biologically inevitable, and we fail to address
the very real physical, emotional, and mental risks involved with pregnancy and childbirth, as
well as the emotional and mental stressors involved with childcare. Adrienne Rich, in her essay
“Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” agrees with Wittig, wondering why
“species survival, the means of impregnation, and emotional/erotic relationships should ever
have become so rigidly identified with each other; and why such violent strictures should be
found necessary to enforce women’s total emotional, erotic loyalty and subservience to men”
(232). Rich argues here that women’s capability of producing offspring has, over time, become
an obligation due to the strict gender hierarchy that states men’s desires are worth more than
women’s physical and sexual autonomy. This is evident in that men’s bodies and sex lives are
not regulated to the same level as women’s bodies, if at all. There has yet to be a legislative bill
passed that restricts men’s access to Viagra and vasectomies, or forces unwanted medical
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procedures on them in order for them to access these things. Women are not allowed autonomy
over their bodies simply due to the fact that they have the capability of producing children, and
our legal system is continually trying to implement policies that make sure this disallowance
sticks—these same systems make it close to impossible for women to prevent pregnancies and
terminate the pregnancies that result from the lack of access to birth control methods. For a
society and a legal system that believe that all women are naturally wired for motherhood, they
certainly have to do a lot of work to make sure that women do not opt out! In that regard, what
are women who cannot reproduce or, like myself, have chosen not to reproduce? Are we notwomen? Half-women? How about women who are just beginning or ending their periods, such
as those going through menarche or menopause? How about trans* men, who have decided to
produce children using their biologically female reproductive organs in order to do so? These
questions alone illustrate the illogical nature of defining human beings as only two biological
sexes, and they also demonstrate an inherently violent ideology that is aimed at women who do
not, will not, and/or cannot reproduce.
It is for these reasons that I take serious issue with the way in which society promotes a
natural link between being biologically female, and therefore feminine, and therefore naturally
nurturing and maternal and desiring of pregnancy. In other words, according to today’s social
norms, women by their very nature have an unshakeable desire to bear children. This link has
caused pregnancy and birth to become a compulsory act rather than a choice, and one could
argue that pregnancy and birth were never a choice for women in the first place. For many
people, women are defined by their ability to reproduce; in fact, this very rhetoric concerning
reproductive capability was used to discredit Thomas Beatie’s gender identity. Many people in
both the straight and LGBTQ communities argued that he was not really a man because he had
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decided to keep his ovaries, uterus and vagina, and because he had made the decision to perform
a decidedly female act: giving birth. Many cisgender women criticized him for taking away the
one thing that makes women worthwhile, or at least the one thing that only women can do, and
this alone is evidence of how society’s outdated and hostile connections between biological sex,
gender, and reproduction have become the norm. The vehement censure of Beatie’s decision to
birth his own children has had far-reaching implications outside of his reproductive capabilities
and choices. For example, in March 2013, Beatie decided to divorce from his wife, but the judge
refused to grant the divorce, stating that “he had no jurisdiction to approve a divorce because
there's insufficient evidence that Beatie was a man when he married Nancy Beatie in Hawaii. He
said the Beaties never provided records to fully explain what Thomas Beatie actually had done
and not done to become a man” (Davenport and Fonseca). In other words, the judge refused to
grant them a divorce because, due to Beatie’s apparently ambiguous legal gender status, it was
not entirely clear whether or not he and Nancy were legally married—the issue being that samesex marriage is illegal in Arizona, and therefore, if Beatie was still legally a woman at the time of
the marriage, the marriage would be considered invalid. The general consensus is that the legal,
federal definition of gender includes whatever is present on your birth certificate. In that case,
since Beatie was granted a new birth certificate in Hawaii before the marriage (Davenport and
Fonseca), the marriage would indeed be valid and therefore eligible for a divorce. What is
particularly interesting is the way in which the judge refers to Beatie’s gender as something that
he “became,” and which included certain steps that he would have to take in order to be
considered a man. As Butler notes, “to go from F to M, or from M to F, is not necessarily to stay
within the binary frame of gender, but to engage transformation itself as the meaning of
gender…becoming is the vehicle for gender itself” (65). The judge’s response to Beatie’s gender
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identity reflects this avenue of thought. However, it is clear that, for the judge, the
aforementioned list of steps to “become” a man included the removal of Beatie’s ovaries and
uterus, as well as his cessation of the use of those reproductive organs, as noted by the judge’s
comment that “he was unable to find legal authority defining a man as someone who can give
birth” (Davenport and Fonseca). The reason for this is likely that one’s reproductive capacity is
not referenced in any legal definition of “man” or “woman,” which is also quite interesting to
note. If one’s reproductive capacity were a factor in the legal definition of gender, then anyone
who is infertile would, legally speaking, not be considered a man or a woman.
Gender essentialism is inherent in our analysis of, and reactions to, trans* men’s
pregnancies. In the article “Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity: A Rhetorical Analysis
of Women Interacting with Digital Photographs of Thomas Beatie,” which I referenced earlier in
this paper, Jamie Landau notes that many cis-women’s reactions to male pregnancy have been
negative, arguing a belief that trans* men are attempting to appropriate pregnancy, which is a
specifically “female” domain (182). She notes that “scholars predominantly argue that verbal
and visual representations of male pregnancy generally symbolize male takeover of human
reproduction at the expense of erasing reproducing women” (Landau 183). It is interesting to
explore why, in feminist scholarship and general discourse surrounding pregnancy where ciswomen have been fighting to be viewed as more than just baby-machines, cis-women would
react this way to the ungendering of pregnancy through the lens of the trans* male body. The
majority of the argument surrounding reproductive rights is that women are more than just
walking uteri, and yet when faced with the possibility of male pregnancy, despite not wanting to
be known by our biological reproductive capacity alone, we revert back to the argument that
pregnancy is a woman’s domain. This idea of trans* men appropriating pregnancy and
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invisibilizing pregnant cis women is similar to the transphobic rhetoric of many rad-fem (radical
feminist) groups who argue that trans* women are merely men in drag infiltrating women-only
spaces. Likewise, pregnant trans* men are seen as infiltrating the women-only space of
pregnancy and childbirth, and as a result, male pregnancy is treated as a threat to women’s
reproductive capacity. However, this interpretation of male pregnancy is inherently flawed.
When Thomas Beatie first went public with his pregnancy, women’s pregnant bodies were not
instantly erased from the picture as originally feared. In fact, the complete opposite happened—
the majority of public commentary continued to vehemently argue pregnancy to be a woman’s
domain. The interpretation of trans* male pregnancy as threatening to the “natural order” of
female-bodied pregnancy is interesting in that it requires Thomas Beatie, as well as all trans*
men, to be read as male in order to work. Landau argues that, rather than erasing women’s
pregnant bodies, “a ‘pregnant man’ deconstructs the distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female,’
challenges traditional notions of gender, and enables a person to ‘escape the dictates of biology’”
(183). In other words, the figure of the pregnant man makes visible the problematic way in
which we characterize male-bodied persons as those who sire children and female-bodied
persons as those who carry and give birth to them, and the even more problematic way in which
we have made these characterizations essential to our interpretations of bodies, and our
acceptance of bodies, as either male or female.
Taking the gender out of reproduction, in this case specifically pregnancy, would have
major effects on women’s everyday lives. First of all, there would be no more insistence on
women having babies simply because they are women. Women would no longer have to give
birth in order to prove their womanliness. In fact, most women do not know that they have the
option of not having children, and by taking the essentialist femininity out of pregnancy, women
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would have the option of saying no to motherhood without social sanctions and censure—there
would be no more pressure on women to conform to a gender essentialist mandate of pregnancy,
childbirth, and childcare. Secondly, there would be no more pressure on women to continue an
unwanted pregnancy, as well as no more controversy surrounding abortion care. The
controversy surrounding abortion has much to do with the perception that the instinct towards
motherhood is innate in all women (for the purposes of staying on topic, I am choosing not to
address the “right to life” argument at this point in time). In fact, one of the main factors in
denying women abortions is the presumption that all women’s natural state is “mother.” Antichoice legislation enforcers believe that, through the use of such tactics as waiting periods and
forced ultrasounds, women’s supposedly natural instinct to protect their child will magically kick
in and they will be eager to allow their child to live (to borrow the rhetoric of the anti-choice
movement). These biological women are not just being punished for the general act of having an
abortion; they are also being punished for denying, or even lacking, their "natural" maternal
instincts. As Maura notes in her study “The Gender of Pregnancy,” “when someone fails to do
gender ‘correctly’ he or she is held accountable for his or her social transgressions” (122).
Instead of committing themselves to the “natural” progression of womanmother, they are
instead subjugating the supposed naturalness of that progression by seeking to terminate the
pregnancy, and in the interests of preserving the illusion of the innate nurturing, maternal instinct
of every biological woman, they are being punished for acting their gender incorrectly.
One of the things I have noticed recently about the conversation surrounding pregnancy
and abortion is the overarching message that until men can get pregnant, they have no say in
what women choose to do with their reproductive organs. The essential point of this statement
rings true—unless you are capable of carrying a pregnancy, you should not have a say in what
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other people do with their unwanted pregnancies. This essential point is much more inclusive,
while the original statement fails to acknowledge trans* men who still have their biologically
female reproductive organs—therefore, the assertion that “men cannot get pregnant” is clearly
untrue. Abortion rights are equally important for both ciswomen and trans* men, particularly
when referencing the fact that, for many trans* men, a pregnancy could put them in serious
physical and/or psychological danger. Aaron, a trans* man, had this to say about his pregnancy:
I gave birth to my son in 2004—a son who was wanted, planned for, and loved.
The deep love I had for my child didn't make the pregnancy an easy one, however. I am a
transgender man. I had not come out as transgender or begun transitioning when I was
pregnant, and carrying the pregnancy/giving birth was a very traumatic, difficult
experience due to the cognitive dissonance between my mind and body. After all "men"
can't get pregnant, right? Well, this one did…. The feelings of depression and despair
were only endurable by focusing on the joy that would await me at the completion. (“Our
Stories”)
In Aaron’s case, while he was happy to be pregnant and excited to meet his child, the physical
reality of his pre-transition body combined with the subsequent pregnancy and childbirth—coded
as “female” reproductive acts—did not match the physical, emotional, mental, and psychological
reality of his gender. Aaron chose to keep the pregnancy because he wanted a child, but what
about other trans* men for whom pregnancy and childbirth is physically, emotionally, and
psychologically not an option? While I think the intentions of abortion rights advocates are
essentially good, I think in their rush to defend women’s right to have an abortion, they have
forgotten that there are, in fact, men who can get pregnant and, in turn, men who do not want to
be pregnant. Including trans* men in conversations about abortion rights and abortion rights
activism is crucial, and the gender essentialism in both, whether intentional or not, needs to be
addressed. Anti-choice rhetoric is guilty of this same thing, although on a different level—it is
based on the belief that men do not get pregnant, only women get pregnant, and that all women
who get pregnant must keep the pregnancy. They, too, fail to realize that not all women can get
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pregnant, whether they are cis women or trans* women, and that some men can and do. Another
thing that is important to discuss is trans* men becoming pregnant pre-transition and pre-coming
out as trans*, as in Aaron’s case. On the outside, the pregnancy would look like a typical
pregnancy. However, to someone whose gender identity is the “opposite” of what one would
expect in a pregnancy, this could be anything but typical. We need to consider the implications
of pregnancy from a trans* perspective, not just from a functional reproductive standpoint, but
also from the perspective of psychological, emotional, and mental well-being.

Trans* Reproduction and the Reproductive Mandate
Judith Lorber notes in her book Paradoxes of Gender that “[a]s a process, gender creates
the social differences that define ‘woman’ and ‘man.’ In social interaction throughout their lives,
individuals learn what is expected, see what is expected, act and react in expected ways, and thus
simultaneously construct and maintain the gender order…” (60). One of the many ways in
which gender constructs and maintains the social differences that help maintain the gender order
is, as Judith Butler so aptly terms it, compulsory repetition. Butler argues in her book Undoing
Gender that “according to its [hypostatized heterosexuality] precept, those who enter kinship
terms as nonheterosexual will only make sense if they assume the position of mother or father”
(123-4). Butler then goes on to reference Sylviane Agacinski, who argues within this line of
thinking that “‘…there is no absolute right to a child, since the right implies an increasingly
artificial fabrication of children. In the interests of the child, one cannot efface its double
origin,’” (118) referring to a child’s “‘invariable beginning with a man and woman, a man who
occupies the place of the father, and a woman who occupies the place of the mother’” (Butler
118). In other words, the presumed natural order of reproduction dictates that in the reproductive
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process, there must be a mother and a father in order for the reproductive relationship to make
sense, and speaking from a heterosexist point of view, men are the ones who father the children,
while women are the ones who give birth. When Butler and Agacinski talk about the
reproduction of culture, they are specifically talking about the reproduction of who does what in
the process of reproduction, as well as who plays what role and what that means for the
figurative child. Of course, when talking about men fathering children and women birthing them
in this context, we are expressly talking about cisgender and presumably heterosexual men and
women. It is in this way that reproduction has, over time, become a very specifically gendered
process, and trans* individuals problematize this presumed natural order by making it possible
for women to be fathers and for men to be mothers. In other words, the dictum that “men are
fathers and women are mothers” goes right out the proverbial window. Butler further discusses
the French cultural belief that the child needs the signifiers of mother and father in order to
achieve proper development and to assimilate properly into hir2 culture and society, noting that
“[t]he belief is that culture itself requires that a man and a woman produce a child, and that the
child have this dual point of reference for its own initiation into the symbolic order, where the
symbolic order consists of a set of rules that order and support our sense of reality and cultural
intelligibility” (118). In contemplating this belief, we must recognize that it is not saying that a
child needs the signifying figures of a mother and a father—it is saying that a child needs the
signifying figures of a heterosexual, cisgender, feminine woman as hir mother and a
heterosexual, cisgender, masculine man as hir father. In that regard, one must wonder what
proponents of this belief think will happen when one’s biological father identifies as a woman
and/or one’s biological mother identifies as a man. Wittig notes that “by its very existence,
2

I am choosing to use gender-neutral terminology here and throughout this paper when
applicable.
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lesbian society destroys the artificial (social) fact constituting women as a ‘natural’ group” (103).
Is it not possible, then, that by their very existence, trans* parents destroy the artificial (social)
fact constituting fathers and mothers as natural, specifically gendered groups, as well? When we
start looking at the issue of the right to have children, trans* reproductive rights become not just
a gender issue, and not even just a biology issue, but also a human rights issue.
Gayle Rubin, in her essay “Thinking Sex,” discusses how “[m]odern Western societies
praise sex acts according to a hierarchical system of sexual value….Individuals whose behavior
stands high in this hierarchy are rewarded with certified mental health, respectability, legality,
social and physical mobility, institutional support, and material benefits” (279). In other words,
certain sex acts, such as reproductive sex between married couples, are given more social and
cultural value than others, which results in better social standing for those who commit the sex
acts that society deems most valuable. According to Rubin’s conception of the sexual hierarchy,
“good” sex is considered to be heterosexual, cisgender, and reproductive, while trans*
individuals are at the bottom of said hierarchy (282). A similar hierarchy exists for reproduction,
where society praises certain reproductive acts according to a similar system of reproductive
value. Society’s reproductive mandate simply states that everyone must reproduce; what is not
mentioned, however, is that in order for the reproductive act to carry any social weight, the
participants must be married (preferably), heterosexual, cisgender, and conventionally masculine
or feminine if they are a man or a woman, respectively. Trans* individuals who choose to
reproduce using their biological reproductive organs are a living paradox for the
sexual/reproductive hierarchy, in that they are fulfilling the reproductive mandate (and
participating in “good” sex by reproducing), but they are not the cisgender participants that
society requires in order for the reproductive act to be seen as legitimate and socially valuable.
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Society does not know whether to praise them for reproducing (and thereby following society’s
mandate) or censure them for being the “wrong” people to engage in reproduction.
In American society, trans* people are often only accepted (if they are accepted at all) as
long as they promise to occupy (hetero)normative gender roles. In his essay “Normalized
Transgressions: Legitimizing the Transsexual Body as Productive,” Dan Irving explores how
assimilatory politics play a role in the framing of legitimate transgender/transsexual bodies (15)
and argues that there is an “imperative to be ‘proper’ in the eyes of the state” (23). He goes on to
argue that “the valorization of the maleness or femaleness of post-transition transsexuals hinged
in part on understandings of their productive capacity….The real-life test was administered by
GICs [Gender Identity Clinics] to monitor the ability of the transsexual patient to live entirely as
a demonstrable member of the opposite sex” (Irving 20). For trans* people, this often (if not
always) means giving up their ability to reproduce, since in order for their gender to be
considered “legitimate,” they would have to give up their reproductive organs, which are strictly
gendered. Irving goes on to note that “only a particular transsexual narrative – one that
subscribes to hegemonic and heteronormative categories of sex/gender – will be accepted as a
reflection of genuine transsexualism” (20). While it is true that many trans* individuals would
prefer to have a full operation so that their bodies will match their gender, it is equally true that
other trans* individuals would want to keep their functioning reproductive organs, viewing them
from a purely functional standpoint, so that they would be able to have biological children in the
future. Why is it that trans* individuals who desire biological children must give up an explicitly
wanted working reproductive body in exchange for gender authenticity? In answering this
question, I return to the concept of fertility acting as proof of gender authenticity—in reality, this
only applies to cisgender people. For trans* individuals, the opposite is true—the only proof of
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gender authenticity is sterility. Sterility in cisgender individuals, whether chosen or not, is seen
as a tragedy because society’s reproductive mandate states that they are the “right people” to
engage in the process of reproduction, but it does not weigh in on their gender authenticity—we
do not require infertile cisgender people to undergo fertility treatments in order to consider their
gender legitimate. However, for trans* individuals, there is an unspoken edict that in order for
their gender to be accepted as legitimate, they must give up their right to reproduce using their
original reproductive organs. This is because cisgender people are considered to be doing gender
correctly and therefore do not need to prove the legitimacy of their gender. Society does not
consider transgender people to be doing gender correctly, so it asks them to go to extreme
measures to prove their gender authenticity. This is one example of the social sanctions against
perceived gender noncompliance that Maura Ryan discusses in her study (122), which I
mentioned in my first chapter. Because society sees trans* individuals as doing gender
incorrectly, they are summarily punished. From both a gender and human rights perspective, this
is unacceptable—removal of reproductive organs and elimination of fertility should be a choice,
not a requirement in order to be seen as authentically male or female.
When we think about the reproduction of gender, gender norms, and heteronormative
behaviors, we have to ask ourselves why the fertility/infertility requirement exists. In the past,
“[d]octors who opposed any medical intervention enabling one to change sex did so in part
because they believed that this transition would thwart the…(re)productive potential of the
(presumed) female” (Irving 19). Irving then cites the 1950s sexologist David O. Cauldwell, who
argued that “it would be criminal of a doctor to remove healthy organs” (“Questions and
Answers on the Sex Life and Sexual Problems of Transsexuals”) whereby “[t]he criminal nature
of the surgical act is rooted in Cauldwell’s belief that to operate on the transsexual body is to
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destroy its capacity for a (hetero)sexual life by thwarting the individual’s reproductive potential”
(“Questions and Answers on the Sex Life and Sexual Problems of Transsexuals”). Here, we can
clearly see how sexuality (particularly heterosexuality) and biological capacity for reproduction
are closely linked, as well as how the refusal to operate on a transsexual/transgender body lies in
the belief that a heterosexual, reproductive life is the norm and should be preserved by any
means necessary. Nowadays, while many doctors are willing to operate on trans* individuals’
bodies, the preservation of a working reproductive body is seen as abnormal in the context of
transition. Judith Butler cites the example of David Reimer, who was born biologically male but
whose “penis was accidentally burned and severed in the course of a surgical operation” (59).
Butler notes that David went through
two transsexual surgeries: the first based on a hypothetical argument about what
gender should be, given the ablated nature of the penis; the second based on what
the gender should be, based on the behavioral and verbal indications of the person
in question. In both cases, certain inferences are made, ones that suggest that a
body must be a certain way for a gender to work, another which says that a body
must feel a certain way for a gender to work. (71)
In the first surgery, because David’s penis had been injured so extremely, it was decided that he
should live as a girl because, without a working penis, he could not be a man. In the second
surgery, it was David’s insistence that he was a man that allowed him the opportunity to
“become” a man again. For those who are transitioning from male to female, or vice versa, they
may not necessarily want to give up a working reproductive body in order for their gender to be
seen as authentic. However, because biology and gender are so intricately linked in our society,
there is a strict assertion that in order to be a woman or a man, you must have certain body parts,
so many trans* individuals might feel that having all possible surgeries is necessary. Separating
gender from reproduction will extend trans* individuals’ freedom to reproduce biologically
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related children, should they desire them, by taking away the feeling that it is absolutely
necessary to remove one’s reproductive organs in order to be considered a man or woman.
Irving further argues in his essay “Normalized Transgressions,” “[t]hat the organization
of (re)production wields a significant influence on the social construction of sex and gender is a
rudimentary point of feminist political economy. The construction of transsexual identities visà-vis capitalist productive relations serves to enrich our understanding of the ways that
sex/gender are constructed as regulatory regimes” (17). It is a well-known concept that sex and
gender are social constructs that act as regulatory factors in our lives, and the issue of
reproductive organs being used for a purely functional purpose highlights this very clearly.
When arguing the issue of trans* individuals using their reproductive organs from a purely
functional perspective, rather than seeing those organs as signifiers of a specific gender/gender
identity, we need to remember that there are plenty of cisgender individuals who also use their
reproductive organs for a purely functional purpose—reproduction, whether it is through sexual
intercourse, in-vitro fertilization (IVF), where the egg is fertilized outside of the womb and the
resulting embryo is implanted into the uterus, or intra-uterine insemination (IUI), where the
sperm is collected from the father and inserted into the uterus via a medical procedure. The
gender identities of those cisgender individuals, to my knowledge, are not called into question.
The only time that the functional use of reproductive organs becomes an issue from a gendered
perspective is when trans* individuals attempt to do so, at which point the gendered nature of
reproductive organs and processes suddenly becomes highly visible. We need to ask ourselves
why it is so easy to ignore gender when it comes to the reproductive organs and processes of
cisgender individuals, but not when it comes to those of trans* individuals. Of course, looking at
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reproductive organs and reproduction itself as purely functional is not all that romantic, but it is
practical, and certainly more inclusive, from a gendered perspective than the alternative.
Now, of course, we must also take into consideration what to do with the terminology
when it comes to trans* individuals who have chosen to use their biological reproductive organs
in order to reproduce. Up until this point, the assumption has been that if you are a man who
reproduces, you are a father, and if you are a woman who reproduces, you are a mother. Does
this labeling depend on the gender identity of the person involved in the reproduction of these
children, or on the biological reproductive process which they are undergoing? If the former is
true, then logic states that a trans* man who gives birth to his children, even though he is using
what has traditionally been a “woman’s” reproductive organs, will still be considered a father,
and a trans* woman who produces children using what has traditionally been a “man’s”
reproductive organs will still be considered a mother. However, if the latter is true, then logic
states that a trans* man who gives birth will be considered a mother, and a trans* woman who
sires children will be considered a father. In Thomas Beatie’s case, in a 2012 interview with
Oprah Winfrey, he stated that “I don’t see myself as both a mother and a father—I see myself as
a father who gave birth” (“The Pregnant Man’s Life Today”). In this regard, Beatie does not
view his ovaries, his uterus, his pregnancies, or the subsequent births of his children as being
essentially female and resulting in motherhood; rather, he views them as simply another means
of achieving fatherhood. It is interesting to note that he went on to have surgery to create a penis
after the births of his children, so there was clearly a desire to have his physical body match his
gender identity at some point, but the fact of the matter is that his reproductive organs in and of
themselves, while they have been coded “female,” acted purely in a functional reproductive
standpoint, as opposed to a functional and gendered reproductive standpoint. He went on to say
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that “Susan, Austin, and Jensen [his children] call me Daddy, and that is my name. I’m not
Thomas anymore, I’m Daddy,” (Winfrey) and towards the end of the interview, he states that
“Through all of this I have determined that’s my meaning and purpose in life, is to usher these
human beings into this world and make sure I’m always there for them” (Winfrey). What is
fascinating about his assessment of his identity as a father is that it is all-consuming, which many
would likely point out as being a stereotypically female way of viewing parenthood. In Beatie’s
case, he acknowledges that, after becoming a father, he is no longer Thomas, but Daddy—his
identity as a father has superseded all else. He takes that one step further in his declaration that
the birth of his children is his raison d’être, which demonstrates his clear devotion to his
children. However, this also plays into an extremely conservative model of family that erases all
agency for the parent, in which the person’s children and their relationship to their children
replaces the rest of the parent’s identity. In that regard, while it appears that Thomas Beatie’s
identity as a trans* man does not necessarily destroy the artificial creation of “mother” and
“father” or the changes that come with those labels, it does complicate the two in that it
demonstrates clearly that it is not only cisgender individuals who take on the parenting role.
Trans* individuals do so, as well, and they are equally capable of being dedicated to their
children. Of course, there is another option that we can consider—simply referring to a parent as
a parent. The words “mother” and “father” have specifically gendered connotations, and if our
ultimate goal is to take the gender out of reproduction, then would it not make the most sense to
take the gender out of parenthood, as well? Perhaps this would only make sense if we insisted
on attaching the words “mother” and “father” to gender. What if we were to look at the words
from a social perspective? As Judith Butler argues, while it is physically necessary for an egg
and a sperm to meet in order for another human being to be produced, “are sperm donors or one-
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night stands, or indeed, rapists, really fathers in a ‘social’ sense” (10)? In other words,
committing the physical act of reproduction does not necessarily make one a parent—it is the
physical presence and emotional involvement that makes one a parent, and you do not have to be
cisgender in order to be physically present and emotionally involved with your child. If we were
to look at the roles of mother and father in this way, it creates a more inclusive definition of the
two words. In other words, rather than arguing that a mother is simply a woman who gives birth
and that a father is simply a man who sires a child, we could instead argue that a mother is
someone who identifies as a woman who takes care of a child and a father is someone who
identifies as a man who does the same. We have already established that definition when it
comes to adoptive parents (often putting the distinction “adoptive” in front of the word mother or
father), so why can we not do the same when it comes to parents who happen to be trans*?
Ultimately, when it comes to trans* individuals reproducing using their biological
reproductive organs, society sees that action as a threat to its stability and its carefully crafted
sex/gender/reproductive hierarchy. They see this as a threat because trans* fathers who give
birth to their own children and trans* mothers who inseminate their partners complicate the
supposedly natural order of man = father and woman = mother. The process of reproduction
does not just produce more human beings—it also helps reproduce the sex/gender binary. From
the moment we are born, from the moment we are placed in that blue or pink blanket (depending
on our genitalia), we are socialized into performing gender in a certain way. As Judith Lorber
notes in her essay “The Social Construction of Gender,” “[gender inequality] is produced and
maintained by identifiable social processes and built into the general social structure and
individual identities deliberately and purposefully….The paradox of human nature is that it is
always a manifestation of cultural meanings, social relationships, and power politics” (101).
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Society continually attempts to convince us that the sex/gender binary is the result of a natural
impetus of males towards masculinity and of females towards femininity, but we know that this
is not the case. If it really were the result of natural forces, then it would not be necessary for
“[p]olitical power, control of scarce resources, and, if necessary, violence [to] uphold the
gendered social order in the face of resistance and rebellion” (Lorber 101). Trans* reproduction
is absolutely an act of rebellion against the sex/gender binary, which dictates not only that men
and women occupy different reproductive roles in society, but also that these roles can never
change and that men and women can never switch these roles. Lorber notes that
Gender is so pervasive that in our society we assume it is bred into our genes.
Most people find it hard to believe that gender is constantly created and re-created
out of human interaction, out of social life, and is the texture and order of that
social life. Yet gender, like culture, is a human production that depends on
everyone constantly ‘doing gender.’ (101)
Society depends on men and women occupying the gender roles that have been assigned to them,
and it also depends on everyone accepting its “naturalness” as a given, despite the social
sanctions and manipulations that are necessary to continually reproduce this naturalness. Trans*
individuals who choose to reproduce using their biological reproductive organs force us to
question the authenticity of natural gender roles, as well as the naturalness of the sex/gender
binary itself, by proving that one does not necessarily have to be a woman in order to give birth,
nor does one necessarily have to be a man in order to father children. The norm of cisgender
women giving birth and cisgender men fathering children helps reproduce the norm that women
are naturally feminine, passive, and nurturing, while men are naturally masculine and
authoritative, and that is the crux of why trans* individuals who choose to keep their biological
reproductive organs and have children using those organs are vilified by society—because they
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prove that society’s beliefs about sex and gender and their relationship to reproduction are
wrong.

Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have explored the existing social and cultural beliefs
surrounding biology, gender, and reproduction, and I find that they are rabidly hetero- and
cissexist. For everyone, but especially for those of us who have chosen not to reproduce and for
those who have chosen to reproduce outside of the hetero- and cissexual norm, our ability and
desire (or lack thereof) to reproduce being artificially tied to our gender identity (and vice versa)
creates a violent ideology that is inherently sexist and transphobic. Even though society’s
reproductive mandate, at least on paper, simply dictates that everyone must reproduce, in a more
subtle and sinister manner, it also dictates that only certain people with certain bodies, gender
identities, and modes of reproduction are normal, and those of us who want to exist outside the
norm have to go to excessive measures in order to be considered legitimate. For many trans*
individuals, that means giving up an explicitly wanted functional reproductive body in exchange
for socially recognized gender authenticity. This is deplorable from a gender equality,
reproductive rights, and human rights perspective, and it is for this reason that it is imperative
that we re-examine and redefine the relationships between biology, gender, and reproduction.
Considering the number of individuals who identify as trans* and the likelihood that
these individuals will reproduce, it seems that the “natural” order of man as father and woman as
mother will shortly be coming to an end. However, in order to achieve that goal, we must
deconstruct these harmful connections between sex, gender, and reproduction. We must also ask
many “who, what, when, where, why, and how” type questions: why do these connections exist?
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Whom do these connections benefit, and whom do they harm? What can be done to complicate
these connections and interrupt their supposedly natural and normal existence? This paper seeks
to attempt to answer some of those questions, although it has far from answered all of them. It is
relatively simple to answer the first question and, in answering it, I also answer the second—
these connections between sex, gender, and reproduction exist because they benefit those whose
bodies conform to society’s expectations and because they directly and indirectly harm those
whose bodies do not fit into the socially constructed gender binary. The last question,
unfortunately, is a little harder to answer. Some would argue that increased visibility of
LGBTQ+ pregnancies and families could help in this regard, and it might. However, we need to
avoid perpetuating a heteronormative standard of family structure—not all families have two
parents, for example. Some families have only one parent, or multiple parents. Instead of
promoting only two-parent families in our quest for visibility, we need to show families of all
kinds—along with the usual image of a gay or lesbian couple adopting children, we also need to
show single trans* men having children through artificial insemination with the intention of
being a single parent, poly* families of all sexual orientations and genders raising their children
all together, a couple made up of a cisgender man and a trans* woman adopting children, just to
name a few. We need to show that there is no single definition of what makes a family, and in
turn show that there is no single definition of what makes a parent.
One of the shortcomings of this paper is that it is purely theoretical—unfortunately, I fell
out of contact with my friend Natalie, who is a trans* woman and who inspired me to write this
paper in the first place, shortly after I began writing. I would have loved to have her perspective
on this issue, since she is co-parenting her biological child from a previous relationship (when
she was still presenting as male) with her current cisgender female partner and, when I last spoke
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to her, was planning to inseminate her partner “the old fashioned way,” as she put it, in order to
have another biological child. I would have also liked to get in contact with Thomas Beatie
himself and ask him a few questions concerning his thoughts on transgender reproduction, since
he continues to be a public figure on the subject. My thoughts and theories on this subject can
only do so much, and I hope that someone will be inspired by my work to take it one step further
and conduct a sociological study of trans* individuals who have chosen to reproduce using their
biological reproductive organs that further explores the connections between biological sex and
gender identity and how they relate to reproduction and the choices related to it.
Our society’s reproductive mandate is harmful to everyone in that it forces individuals
who may or may not want to reproduce to do so anyway. However, there is a specific harm done
to those whose bodies, genders, and reproductive choices do not fit into the binary that society
insists is normal and natural. The reproductive mandate clearly focuses on heterosexual couples
made up of one cisgender, conventionally masculine man and one cisgender, conventionally
feminine woman, and society depends on the repetition of this reproductive pairing in order to
prove to society’s members (and possibly even itself) that this is the natural order of things. Any
reproductive act that occurs outside of this is deemed abnormal and suspect because it interrupts
and complicates the message that society is attempting to convey and gives real-life examples
proving that the natural order of things is kept in place through very unnatural means—social
sanctions, censure, and violence. Trans* individuals who choose to reproduce using the
reproductive organs with which they were born summarily destroy the belief that only women
can give birth and only men can father children, thereby destroying the image of the natural
order of gender in relationship to biology and reproduction. Forcing trans* individuals to give
up a wanted functional reproductive body in exchange for gender authenticity is punishment for
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daring to question the perceived sex/gender binary in relationship to reproduction and a feeble
attempt to preserve the naturalness of said binary. If we were to start viewing reproductive
organs from a purely functional perspective instead of as proof of gender authenticity, it would
be much more inclusive from both a gender and reproductive standpoint. It is entirely possible
that it would also help erode the sex/gender binary and expand the relationship between
sex/gender and the reproductive process, thereby opening up our society to different reproductive
possibilities.
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